

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~Security Information~~

75777

25 November 1952

SUBJECT: SE-34: TERMS OF REFERENCE: CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTEMPT
TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT REGIME IN ALBANIA
(Draft for Board consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable courses of action by the Soviet bloc countries and by Albania's neighbors in the event of an attempt to overthrow the present regime in Albania, and to estimate internal and external developments in the event such an attempt should be successful.

SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

It has been previously estimated (NIE-42/1) that the present regime in Albania could be overthrown only if there were external inducements and external assistance. It is assumed that such inducements and assistance would be provided by Yugoslavia or the US. The source and nature of these inducements and assistance

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

will affect the outcome of the venture, the reactions of other countries, the nature of the new regime, and probable developments after the new regime was installed. The analysis will need to proceed upon each of several assumptions as to the nature and source of outside aid.

- a. Yugoslav sponsorship: The overthrow attempt is engineered by Yugoslavia, utilizing such emigre elements as are willing to cooperate, but utilizing also such Yugoslav forces (made up primarily of Kosovars) as may be necessary to insure success against the present Albanian regime.
- b. Emigre Action with Yugoslav and US Support: The overthrow attempt is carried out from Yugoslav bases utilizing primarily emigre elements. The US has given at least tacit consent, has encouraged all anti-Hoxha elements to cooperate in the coup attempt, and has promised to assist the new regime.
- c. US-Aided Emigre Action: The overthrow attempt is carried out from Italian or African bases, without

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

prior consultation with the Yugoslavs, by pro-Western elements with US assistance. Some coordination with the Italians would be presumed necessary.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. PRESENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ALBANIAN REGIME AND TOWARD THE STATUS QUO IN THE BALKANS

- A. Albanian people -- What is their attitude toward the present regime? What would be the preferred alternative?
- B. USSR -- How do the Kremlin leaders look at Albania? How important is it to them? What indications are there of present Soviet intentions toward Albania?
- C. Yugoslavia -- What are present Yugoslav intentions? Is there any indication of a change since publication of NIE-42/1?
- D. Italy -- Do the Italians hope to regain influence in Albania, or would they prefer the status quo?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

E. European NATO countries -- In general, would the NATO countries prefer the status quo to the risks involved in any sort of change?

F. Arab-Asian bloc -- Do any of the countries of this bloc have any strong views about Albania? Would they react against any effort to alter the status quo?

II. PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A COUP ATTEMPT

For each of the following sets of questions, distinguish where appropriate between coup attempts (a) sponsored by the Yugoslavs, (b) supported jointly by the US and Yugoslavia, or (c) supported by the US. Indicate in each instance the evidence or reasoning in support of the judgment.

A. USSR

1. Would the Kremlin associate the US with any coup attempt regardless of its real source?
2. Would the USSR provide direct assistance to Hoxha, either by air or sea, or by marching across Yugoslav territory?

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

3. Would it, as an alternative, direct the Satellites to provide assistance, through direct attack via Yugoslavia or merely by infiltration tactics? or
4. Would the USSR accept the probable loss of Albania and confine its reaction to political and diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere?

B. European Satellites

1. Would a coup attempt in Albania prematurely stimulate overt resistance in the Satellites? Would it weaken the Soviet hold on the Satellites or would it provoke even stronger Soviet controls?
2. If directed by the USSR to assist the Albanian regime, would the Satellites be capable of doing so? Would they show enthusiasm or drag their feet?

C. Greece

1. If forewarned, would the Greeks agree to abide by the results, or would they insist upon a role in the attempt and a division of the spoils?
2. If not forewarned, would the Greeks seize the opportunity to occupy Northern Epirus?

5

TOP SECRET

D. Yugoslavia

1. Would the Yugoslavs agree to cooperate with the US on any other basis than US acceptance of Tito-dominated new Albanian regime?
2. If not advised in advance of a US-supported coup, would the Yugoslavs seize the opportunity (a) to march in and occupy part of the country or (b) to set up a rival revolutionary government?

E. Italy

1. Upon what terms would Italy agree to cooperate in providing base support for a coup attempt?
2. If not forewarned, would Italy make a show of force in order to play a role in the new regime?

F. The European NATO Powers

1. Would the NATO countries politically support Yugoslavia and/or the US in the event of Soviet-Satellite counteraction? If that counteraction included local military action? or
2. Would the NATO countries become fearful of Soviet counteraction and condemn the coup attempt?

- 6 -
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

G. Arab-Asian Bloc

1. Would any of the countries of the Arab-Asian bloc support the USSR in political action against Yugoslavia and/or the US?
2. What would be the long-range effect upon US relations with the Arab-Asian countries?

III. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP

In answering the following questions, distinguish where appropriate between coups (a) sponsored by the Yugoslavs, (b) supported by the US and Yugoslavia, and (c) supported by the US.

A. Internal

1. What would be the nature of the new regime? If a coalition, how stable would that coalition be? Which elements would receive greatest popular support? What internal security problems would it face?
2. What would be the regime's economic problems? What kind and how much economic assistance would be required?

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. What would be the internal consequences of a US security guarantee? Of no US guarantee?

B. External

1. What would be the effect of a US security guarantee upon Soviet, Yugoslav, Italian and Greek actions?
2. If there were no US guarantee, what courses of action would the USSR, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy pursue toward the new regime?
3. What would be the impact of a new regime upon the Balkans? Would rivalries between Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia be intensified? If so, would it interfere with their developing cooperation in the military field?
4. What would be the net effect upon the Western strategic position in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean?

~~TOP SECRET~~